A. Non- FOD Sensitive An area where the risk associated with a FO is negligible and no FOD control measures are needed.

B. FOD Awareness Area An area where the risk associated with a FO resulting in hardware damage/contamination is low.

C. FOD Control Area An area where the risk associated with a FO resulting in hardware damage/contamination is medium.

D. FOD Critical Area An area where the risk associated with a FO resulting in hardware damage/contamination is high.

Foreign Object (FO) and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Definitions APPENDIX

A.1 Clean-As-You-Go - Defined by National Aerospace FOD Prevention, Inc. (NAFPI) as follows: “Clean the immediate area when work cannot continue. Clean the immediate area when debris has the potential to migrate to an out of sight or inaccessible area and give the appearance of poor workmanship. Clean the area prior to leaving it unattended, when work cannot continue, after work is completed or at the end of shift, whichever comes first. If you see something, drop something, see or hear something drop, pick it up.”

A.2 Consumables - For the purposes of this procedure, supplies provided to workers that are considered expendable; i.e., personal protective equipment, sealants, solvents, paint, brushes, applicators, sandpaper, rags, wipes, rivets, washers, fasteners, and other hardware.

A.3 Corrective Action Plan - Steps to be taken to prevent the root cause(s) of a FO and/or FOD incident from occurring again. The corrective action plan is not the direction necessary to remove the FO and restore the hardware.

A.4 Critical Foreign Object - FO debris that has a significant probability of causing system or component malfunction or deterioration if the item containing the FO debris is put into use.

A.5 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) - Any damage attributed to a FO that can be expressed in physical or economic terms, which may or may not degrade the product’s safety and/or performance characteristics.

A.6 Foreign Object (FO) - A substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or system that would potentially cause damage.

A.7 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Awareness Area - Any area designated as a low-risk area where quality sensitive products or hardware are in place and exposure to FOs would potentially cause a system or product malfunction or failure. Organizational Culture is focused on safety, reliability, and functionality by protecting all personnel, products and services from FO debris and damage.

A.8 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Control Area - Any area identified as a medium-risk area where quality sensitive products or hardware are in place and exposure to FOs would potentially cause system or product damage, malfunction or failure. Stringent accountability measures shall be applied to control the risk of FOD in the area.

A.9 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Critical Area - Any area identified as a high-risk area where quality sensitive products or hardware are in place and exposure to FOs would potentially cause system or product damage, malfunction or failure. Strict accountability measures shall be applied to control the risk of FOD in the area.

A.10 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Sensitive Area – any area designated as either a FOD Awareness Area, a FOD Control Area, or a FOD Critical Area.

A.11 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Sensitive Work – Work that is being conducted in a FOD sensitive area.

A.12 Foreign Object (FO) and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Incident - An instance where a FO or FOD is found.

A.13 Housekeeping - Basic element of controlling a safe and effective work environment. Proper cleaning and organizing techniques are followed to ensure the prevention and elimination of FOs. Maintenance, manufacturing, testing and all other operational areas shall remain clean and organized with the ultimate goal to prevent debris from migrating into critical and complex hardware and facilities. The clean-as-you go work ethic is one of the most effective provisions for production, service, and preservation of products.

A.14 Non-FOD Sensitive - An area where the risk associated with a FO is negligible and no FOD control measures are needed.

A.15 Shadowbox - A tool box with specific, marked locations for each tool so that a missing tool will be readily noticeable.

A.16 Tether - A lanyard of sufficient strength (wire, rope, cable, etc.) attached to the tool/equipment and to the user or fixed secure object. The tether should be minimum length to preclude damage from tethered tool “free swing”.

A.17 Tote Tray - A device for storing/carrying/transporting tools or equipment in a secure manner to prevent inadvertent dropping: i.e., a tool holder, an apron with pocket rings to which tools can be secured. Tote trays with lids will have the lid secured to the tote tray body.

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Corrosion, Metal Fatigue Causes Wide-Body Freighter Landing Gear Collapse

Original post courtesy of NTSB.gov

WASHINGTON (Aug. 23, 2018) — The landing gear collapse on a FedEx MD-10-10F, wide-body cargo jet was caused by corrosion that led to fatigue cracking, according to an NTSB report released Thursday.

Shortly after the FedEx MD-10-10F touched down at the Fort Lauderdale – Hollywood International Airport Oct. 28, 2016, the flight crew reported hearing a “bang” as the brakes were applied. The airplane yawed to the left as it decelerated and came to rest on the left side of the runway, followed by a fuel-fed fire on the left wing. The two crew members evacuated the plane with one suffering minor injuries during the egress. The plane was damaged beyond economical repair.

The final resting position of a FedEx MD-10-10F after it left the runway following the collapse of the left main landing gear during an attempted landing at Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport is depicted in this Oct. 29, 2016, photo of the accident site. (NTSB Photo by Dan Bower)

Investigators found the failure of the left main landing gear was the result of a metal fatigue crack that initiated within the gear.  The crack went undetected and gradually progressed until the gear collapsed.

The NTSB also said the interval of nine years between scheduled overhauls of the main landing gear, which exceeded Boeing’s recommendation of eight years, contributed to the accident. Investigators determined the fatigue crack would likely have been detected during an overhaul. The gear failed eight years and 213 days after its last overhaul.

The 23-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xUu8d.

The accident docket, which includes photographs, interview summaries, factual reports and other materials used in the course of the investigation, is available at https://go.usa.gov/xUuWd.


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